This paper examines how the decline of communication costs between management and production facilities within firms and the decrease in trade costs of manufactured goods affect the spatial organization of a two-region economy with multi-unit multi-plant firms.
Introduction
Firms have fragmented their production activity dramatically in recent years. However, depending on industrial type, there exist significant differences in the location pattern of production activity. For example, the location pattern of consumer electronics production is quite different from that of automobile industry.
Hard disc drive industry, for example, separated the location of assembly process globally. Gourevitch, Bohn and Mckendrick (2000) have explored the following story in detail. In 1980, over 80% of the world's hard disks were assembled in the United States. While 15 years later over 80% of the world's hard disks were made by US firms, but less than 5% of drives were assembled in the United States. Most disk drives are assembled in-house through overseas production networks. Southeast Asia, especially Singapore, occupies the 64% of world final assembly in 1997. Subassembly with low skilled and labor intensive activity is done mainly in China. Whereas, R&D is located mainly in Silicon Valley where the close collaborative process of firms yields strong knowledge externalities (Saxenian 1996) . Furthermore, such consumer electronics sector developed many global standards.
On the other hand, large automobile companies have established manufacturing plants recently in nearly all of major regional markets around the world because of high trade costs due to government regulations and cultural differences. New plants are also located in the emerging markets such as Thailand and Indonesia. Rugman and Hodgets (2001) suggests that regional production and large local sales occur in North America, Europe and Japan.
Such a fragmentation of production activity has been caused by several major factors. One is the large wage-differentials among countries. In connection with the example of hard disc drive industry above, the hourly wage rate for people involved in assembly in 1995 is as follows: China, $.25; Singapore, $7.28; and United States, $17.20 (Gourevitch, Bohn and Mckendrick 1997) . Another motivation to separate productions arises from the recent development of information technology (IT). In general, the information transfer between headquarters and plants involves more costs when HQs communicate with remote plants, where HQs provide their plants with various services such as management, R&D, marketing and finance. For example, Kim (1999) mentioned about U.S. manufacturing that "the cost of coordinating the activities of plants located in different regions was higher than the cost of managing a similarly sized firm with only one plant". However, the rapid progress in communication technology has been decreasing communication costs greatly. Bernstein (2000) shows, for example, that the use of modern communication equipments reduces significantly the variable costs for Canadian manufacturing industry, which is highly integrated with the U.S. economy. The third major cause is, of course, the significant decrease in trade costs of products, which reflects the progress in transportation technology (based on IT).
The objective of this paper is to provide an analytical framework within which we can assess the impact of the decrease in communication costs between HQs and plants and in transportation costs of products on the spatial organization of multi-unit firms. The recent literature on economic geography mostly assumes that firms are integrated, with each firm conducting its entire operation at a single location (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999) . Fujita and Thisse (2002) is an exception, considering a general equilibrium model in which each firm has the headquarters and a plant. In this paper, we extend Fujita and Thisse (2002) by introducing multi-plant firms. Indeed, many multinational firms have a large number of plants in different countries.
The setting of our model is as follows. The economic space consists of two regions, A and B. The economy has two production sectors, the modern sector (M) and the traditional sector (T). There are two production factors, the high-skilled workers and the low-skilled workers. The economy is endowed with given populations of unskilled and of skilled workers. The skilled workers are perfectly mobile between regions whereas the unskilled are immobile. The M-sector produces a continuum of varieties of horizontally differentiated products under increasing returns, using both skilled and unskilled workers. The T-sector produces a homogeneous good under constant returns, using unskilled labor as the only input. The productivity of unskilled workers in the T-sector is assumed to be higher in region A than in region B. Each variety of M-good is produced by a separate firm. Each firm has the headquarter and one or two plants. When a plant is not located with HQ, communication cost are involved. The second plant requires an additional fixed cost. To send the differentiated products to the other region, transportation cost is required. We endogenise the entry decision of firms. Each firm can choose whether to have a plant in either region or a plant in each region. We focus on equilibria in which all headquarters are agglomerated in region A (the core region), while plants may be dispersed. Using our model, we investigate how different levels of transportation costs, communication costs, and the fixed costs for the second plant may generate different spatial patterns of production.
Following the presentation of the model in Section 2, we determine in Section 3 the conditions for the location pattern of plants and the agglomeration of all headquarters in the core. Section 4 examines the impact of decreasing trade costs and communication costs on the location pattern of plants. We show that each firm has a single plant that locates together with the HQ, when 1) the fixed costs to build an additional plant are large, 2) the trade costs of manufactured goods are small, and 3) communication costs are high. By contrast, each firm has a single plant which locates in the separate region from the HQ, when 1)the fixed costs to build an additional plant are large, 2)the trade costs of manufactured goods are small, and 3)the communication costs are low. Whereas multi-plant firms emerge when 1)the fixed costs to build an additional plant are small, 2)the trade costs of manufactured goods are large and 3)the communication costs are medium.
1
In Section 5, we conduct the welfare analysis, examining the impact of decreasing communication costs on the welfare of skilled and unskilled workers. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The model
Based on the general setting introduced in the preceeding section, we specify our model as follows. Preferences are identical across all workers and expressed by a Cobb-Douglas utility:
where Q is an index of the consumption of M varieties, while Υ stands for the consumption of the output of the traditional sector. When the modern sector provides a continuum of differentiated varieties of size m, the index Q is given by
where q(i) represents the consumption of variety i ∈ [0, m]. In (2), the parameter ρ represents the inverse of the intensity of love for variety over the differentiated products. When ρ is close to 1, differentiated goods are close to perfect substitutes; when ρ decreases, the desire to consume a greater variety of manufactured goods increases. If we set
then σ is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Because there is a continuum of firms, each firm is negligible and the direct interactions between any two firms are zero, but the aggregate market conditions affect each firm. If Y is the consumer income, p T the price of the traditional good and p(i) the price of variety i, then the demand functions are
where P is the price index of differentiated products, given by
Substituting (3) and (4) into (1) yields the indirect utility function
Technologies in each of the two sectors differ from what is usually assumed in economic geography models. The technology in the T-sector is such that one unit of output requires a r ≥ 1 units of unskilled labor in region r = A, B. Without loss of generality, assuming that the ratio of land to population is large in region A and small in region B, we set a A = 1 and a B ≥ 1, thus allowing unskilled workers in the traditional sector to be more productive in region A than in region B. Let L A and L B be the number (mass) of unskilled workers in region A and B, respectively. In order to retain the standard assumption of symmetry between the two regions, we assume that the spatial distribution of unskilled workers is such that both regions have the same amount of effective units of unskilled labor:
The output of the T-sector is costlessly traded between any two regions and is chosen as the numéraire so that p T = 1. We further assume that the expenditure share (1 − µ) on the T-good is sufficiently large for the T-good to be always produced in both regions. In this case, the equilibrium wages for the unskilled are such that
Hence, a factor-price motive may explain the multinationalization of firms. However, as will be seen below, factor price differential is not the only reason for vertical fragmentation. The technology of the M-sector is more complex. The setting of a headquarter requires a fixed amount f of skilled workers when the firm has a single plant. Whereas, when the firm has two plants, the setting of a headquarter(HQ) needs a fixed amount (1 + α)f of skilled workers, where 0 < α < 1. If w H r denotes the skilled workers' wage in region r, then, using (6) and (7), the total income of region r is
where S r is the number of skilled worker in region r. When the HQ is located in region r and the plant in region s, producing q(i) units of variety i requires l(i) units of unskilled labor;
where c rs > 0 is the plant's marginal labor requirement. The value of c rs decreases with the effectiveness of the services provided by the HQ to its plant, which depends itself on the following two factors. First, the accumulation of human capital and face-to-face communications within the same region generates Marshallian externalities which make the HQ of firm i more effective in its supply of services to its plant. This implies that c rs decreases with the number S r ≥ 0 of skilled workers living in region r. Second, the distance between the HQ and its plant affects negatively the effectiveness of the HQ-services. This is because (i) it is easier to monitor the effort of the plant manager when the plant is located near the HQ than across borders (Grossman and Helpman 2004) and (ii) the transmission of information at a distance is often imperfect (Leamer and Storper 2001) . More precisely, when both the HQ and its plant are located in the same region (r = s) we have c rs = c(S r ), whereas c rs = c(S r )T H holds when they are located in different regions (r = s). Here, T H > 1 expresses all the difficulty to communicate within the firm when the HQ and a plant are physically separated, which is represented by the iceberg transfer technology of HQ-services to the plant. When the information is not easily transferred, T H may become large. When the plant is set up with its HQ in region r, the plant production function is thus given by
By contrast, when the plant is located in a different region, we have:
This specification has two implications. First, when the plant is not located with its HQ, it is less efficient and therefore needs a larger amount of local input. That is, we recognize that the physical separation of HQs and plants generates a cost for firms. However, we also recognize that the development in communication technologies means the decrease of T H . Second, unskilled workers are equally productive under the same level of HQ-services once they work in firms. This is because firms are able to organize their production in the same way whatever the plant's location. Furthermore, because of the existence of a perfectly competitive traditional sector in each of the two regions, the nominal wage rate of the unskilled (7) is unaffected by the relocation of the industrial plants.
The output of the M-sector is shipped at a positive cost according to the iceberg technology: when one unit of the differentiated product is moved from region r to region s = r, only a fraction 1/T rs arrives at destination where T rs > 1. Here, T rs may be different from T sr , representing an asymmetry in transport conditions. Within each region, transportation is costless. Thus, if a firm has a single plant for variety i in region r, and serves the two regions from the plant, then using (4), the demand for variety i (including the consumption in transportation) is such that
where P r (resp. P s ) is the price index of the differentiated good in region r (s), which is defined later. Next, given that the marginal production cost of a variety at a plant in each region is a constant while fixed costs are needed for an additional plant, it never happens that a firm has a plant in both regions while one region is served from the two plants. Thus, if a firm has a plant for variety i in both regions, each plant serves the regional demand given respectively by q r (i) = µY r p r (i) 
which yields, using (9), the equilibrium mill price charged by the plant located in region r:
Similarly, the profit of firm i ∈ M r s with r = s is
So that the equilibrium mill price charged by the plant located in region s is as follows:
Let M r mp (resp. m r mp ) be the set (resp. the mass) of multi-plant (mp) firms whose headquarters are in region r and a plant in each region. The profit of
which yields, using (10) and (11), we have the same equilibrium mill price charged by each plant in region r and region s as (12) and (14) respectively. Using (5), (12) and (14), and recalling that a plant of each multi-plant firm serves only the region where it locates, we have the regional price index 8 in region r as follows:
in which the first two terms correspond to the varieties produced in region r and the last two for those imported from region s. The real wages of the unskilled and skilled workers are defined as follows:
For a given distribution of HQs and plants between the two regions, the equilibrium profits may be obtained as follows:
σ σ is a positive constant. Therefore, the free entry condition becomes
which implies that the wage paid to the skilled workers comes from the operating profits earned by plants. Finally, since the HQ of each single-plant firm requires a fixed amount of skilled workers f , and that of each multi-plant firm requires (1 + α)f , the skilled-labor constraint in the economy is:
3 Spatial equilibrium when the HQs are agglomerated
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the case where all HQs locate in region A, and examine the equilibrium patterns of plant distribution. In this section, we obtain the equilibrium conditions for each possible pattern of plant distribution. The assumption that all HQs are agglomerated in region A implies that 
Using (12) and (14), and recalling the note bellow (15), the equilibrium mill price at the production site in each region is given by
For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
represents the ratio of the mill price in region A over that in region B, which account for both the communication costs and the wage differential (i.e. the productivity differential of unskilled workers in the T-sector). When information transfer were costless, then T H = 1, and hence φ H takes the values a σ−1 B ≥ 1; when information transfer were impossible, then T H = ∞, so φ H = 0. The index φ AB (resp. φ BA ) measures the accessibility of the differentiated varieties produced in region A (in region B) to the market in region B (in region A), taking values between 0 (when prohibitive transport costs) and 1 (zero transport costs). Thus, φ AB and φ BA represent the degree of market integration in the two-region economy.
When all HQs locate in region A, using (7), (16) and (21), we have the price index in each region as follows:
whereas regional incomes become
Using (7), (16), (17), (18), (19), (21) and (27), we obtain the profit of firms in each type as follows:
Six locational patterns of plant distribution -a preliminary exposition
In our economy, when all HQs are agglomerated in region A, there exist six possible patterns of plant distribution:
Pattern A All plants are located in region A (together with their HQs).
Pattern B All plants are located in region B (separated from their HQs).
Pattern A-B All firms have single plants, some of which locate in region A, whereas the rest in region B.
Pattern A-mp Some firms have single plants in region A, whereas the rest are multi-plant firms with a single plant in each region.
Pattern B-mp Some firms have single plants in region B, whereas the rest are multi-plant firms with one plant in each region.
Pattern mp All firms are of multi-plant, with one plant in each region.
For each pattern, we examine the conditions under which it is an equilibrium. Before conducting formal analyses (in the next subsection), however, in this subsection we explain intuitively which pattern is likely to be realized when. To do so, it is convenient to introduce the following indexes:
implying that
By definition, ξ 
For a preliminary study, let us first consider an extreme case such that α = 1 and hence no multi-plant firm emerge. Finally, in the domain A-B in Figure 1 , it happens that some firms choose region A for their plants, whereas the rest choose region B. Each point in the domain A-B is either close to the origin O and/or close to the diagonal Oc. When a point is close to the origin, each region is in a big disadvantage 3 In Figure 1 , apart of the broken curve cd is below the diagonal 0c. This is because the market A is larger than market B, and hence firms choose region A for their plants even when the ratio ξ 14 in supplying the product to the other region. Hence, some plants should locate in region A while focusing on market A, whereas the rest in region B while focusing on market B. When a point is close to the diagonal Oc, the relative cost advantage of neither region is large. In this case, in order to avoid competition, plants should be dispersed between the two regions. In particular, we can see by (31) and (32) We can also show that when µ/σ becomes smaller (i.e., the expenditure share µ on the differentiated goods is smaller and/or the degree of product differentiation, 1/σ, is smaller), the two broken curves in Figure 1 become more symmetric with respect to the diagonal Oc. This is because the aggregate income Sw H A of skilled workers in region A becomes smaller as µ/σ becomes smaller (see (28) and (29)), and hence the difference between the aggregate incomes of two regions becomes smaller. Now, we consider the more realistic case such that α < 1, and examine the emergence of multi-plant firms. For an illustration, we set α = 0.2 and µ/σ = 0.5, and obtain the domain of each equilibrium location pattern of plants in the (ξ Inside the square in Figure 2 where ξ A B < 1 and ξ B A < 1, region A (resp. region B) has a lower marginal cost in providing a variety to market A (resp. market B), but a higher marginal cost in providing it to market B (resp. market A). Thus, now, each firm must face the trade-off between the additional fixed cost from setting the second plant and a high marginal cost in serving the two markets from a single-plant.
In the domain A inside the square in Figure 2 , the value of ξ B A is rather close to 1, implying that, in terms of marginal supply cost to the market B, region A dose not have a great disadvantage to region B. Thus, avoiding the additional fixed cost from setting up the second plant, every firm chooses to have a single-plant in region A and to serve the product to the two markets. Likewise, in the domain B inside the square in Figure 2 , all firms choose to have single-plants in region B.
In the domain mp in Figure 2 , however, both ξ A B and ξ B A are very small, meaning that, in terms of marginal supply cost, a plant in one region has a big disadvantage in supplying the product to the other region in comparison with a plant in the other region. Hence, accepting the additional fixed cost of the second plant, all firms choose to have two plants, one in each region. Next, in the domain A-mp in Figure 2 , ξ B A is in the middle between 1 and 0, implying that, in terms of the marginal cost in serving the product to market B, a plant in region A has a significant, but not fatal, disadvantage in comparison with a plant in region B. In this situation, some firms choose to have single plants in region A, whereas the rest choose to have two plants. Notice that, in market B, each two-plant firm has a larger market share than a single-plant firm (having a plant in region A), due to the fact that ξ B A < 1 and the marginal cost pricing given by (23) and (24). However, these multiplant firms involve an additional fixed costs. Thus, the two type of firms can co-exist in the domain A-mp in Figure 2 . Likewise, in the domain B-mp, some firms have single-plants in region B, while the rest have two plants.
When the values of α and µ/σ change, the boundary of each domain in Figure 2 change, of course. To examine this issue precisely, however, we need to determine the boundary of each domain precisely, which is the task of the next subsection.
Equilibrium conditions for six locational patterns
In this subsection, we obtain the equilibrium conditions for each locational pattern, using the profit functions (28) to (30). First, the next lemma identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for all HQs to be agglomerated in region A (See Appendix B for the proof).
Lemma 3.1 All HQs are agglomerated in region A when the following con-dition holds:
In the right-hand side of (37), the term T H represents the decrease in communication costs made by a firm when its HQ moves together with its plant from A to B, whereas the term T µ/(σ−1) AB reflects the increase in the price index of the M-good borne by the skilled workers who move to B with the HQ. Hence, the inequality above means that all firms choose to agglomerate their HQs provided that the Marshallian externalities are sufficiently strong with respect to the ratio of these two opposite effects.
In the rest of the paper, we always assume that condition (37) (31) and (32), we obtain the equilibrium conditions for each pattern of plant-distribution. By definition (31) and (32) 
which is taken as granted in the following discussion.
Pattern A
Setting π A * A = 0 in (28), the wage rate of skilled labor in region A under Pattern A can be obtained as follows (See Appendix C for the derivation):
Clearly, w H A increases when the share of the industrial sector (µ) and the degree of product differentiation (1/σ) rise. This is because the demand for each variety increases. Likewise, w H A increases with the increase of unskilled labor (L). This is because the income in both regions increases. Whereas w H A decreases with the increase of skilled labor (S). The increase in the size of skilled workers causes two effects: first, the income increases in region A; second, the equilibrium number of firms increases. The second effect cancels out the first effect on the consumption by skilled workers. But the second effect remains on the consumption by unskilled workers. Furthermore, the wage of skilled labor is independent from the communication costs and the transportation costs because of the iceberg technology.
Substituting (39) into (27), the ratio of regional incomes in the two regions is given by
which increases as µ/σ increases, not surprisingly. Using the wage function (39), we can obtain the following lemma which gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern A (See Appendix C for the proof). 
, condition (40) reduces to the following one: 
, condition (42) reduces to the following one: (28) and (29), again, we obtain exactly the same wage rate of skilled labor as (39) (See Appendix E for the derivation). Thus, the income ratio Y A /Y B remains the same as (39a). We also have the following share of firms whose plants are located in region B (See Appendix E for the derivation): 
The left-hand side of (45) (28) and (30), again, we obtain exactly the same wage rate of skilled labor as (39) (See Appendix F for the derivation). We also have the following share of firms whose plants are located in region A (See Appendix F for the derivation):
The following lemma gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern A-mp (See Appendix F for the proof). 
The left-hand side of (47) defines the border between the domain A-mp and the domain mp, whereas the right-hand side of (47) (29) and (30), again, we obtain exactly the same wage rate of skilled labor as (39) (See Appendix G for the derivation). We also have the following share of firms whose plants are located in region B (See Appendix G for the derivation):
The following lemma gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern B-mp (See Appendix G for the proof).
Lemma 3.6 Suppose that (37) holds. Then, Pattern B-mp in which some firms have single plants in region B, whereas the rest are multi-plant firms with a single plant in each region, is a spatial equilibrium when the following condition holds:
The left-hand side of (49) defines the border between the domain B-mp and the domain mp in Figure 2 . On the other hand, when 1−µ/σ 2 ≥ α (which is the case for Figure 2) , the right-hand side of (49) gives the borders between the domain B-mp and the domain B and between the domain B-mp and the domain A-B in Figure 2 , whereas, when 1−µ/σ 2 < α, only the border between the domain B-mp and the domain B is defined by the right-hand side of (49).
Pattern mp
Setting π A * mp = 0 in (30), again, we obtain exactly the same wage rate of skilled labor as (39) (See Appendix G for calculation). The following lemma gives the equilibrium condition for Pattern mp (See Appendix G for the proof). 
Conditions (50) and (51) define the domain mp shown in Figure 2 . By (50) and (51), we can see that the domain mp in Figure 2 shrinks with a increase in the additional fixed costs α. We may summarize the results obtained in this section as follows: 
The impact of economic integration on the distribution of plants
In this section, we explore the impact of decreasing communication costs between HQs and plants (φ H increases) and decreasing transportation costs of differentiated products (φ BA and φ AB increase), assuming that Marshallian externalities are strong enough for (37) to hold. To illustrate the shift of location pattern with decreasing communication costs, observe that when the value of T AB T BA is fixed, equation (33) defines a hyperbola. In Figure 3 , two hyperbolas are depicted under different value of T AB T BA . This hyperbola shifts away from the origin as T AB T BA becomes smaller. We can see by (31) and (32) 
Reducing communication costs
This shows that the share of firms which locate single plants in region B increases and the share of firms which have multi-plants decreases with a decrease in communication costs. Using (43) and (49) (31) and (32):
Using (50), (51) and (54), we can see that Pattern mp emerges under the smallest communication costs when transportation costs are large and the productivity difference of the unskilled between regions is small. Therefore, when transportation costs are large and the productivity difference of the unskilled between the regions is small, the location pattern shifts with decreasing communication costs in the following order: Pattern A → Pattern A-mp → Pattern mp. This result imply that multi-plants in automobile firms, which involve large transportation costs, increase with decreasing communication costs. Whereas, using (42), (49) and (54) (42) and (45). Furthermore, using (42) and (54) The discussion above may then be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4.1 When transportation costs are large and the wage difference is small, the location pattern of plants shifts with decreasing communication costs in the following order: Pattern
A → Pattern A-mp → Pattern mp.
Whereas, when transportation costs are small, the location pattern of plants shifts with decreasing communication costs in the following order: Pattern
A → Pattern A-B → Pattern B.
Reducing transportation costs
In this subsection, we examine the impact of decreasing transportation costs (i.e., increasing φ AB and φ BA ) on the location pattern of plants. From (31) and (32) We examine the shift of location pattern when we set transportation costs from region A and from region B take the same value. First, assuming that Pattern mp is held and using (47) and (50) Forth, we examine Pattern A-B. Setting dφ AB = dφ BA ≡ dφ T and dφ H = 0, we have The discussion above may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that transportation costs from region A and from region B takes the same value. Then, the number of the firms having plants in both regions decreases with decrease transportation costs. When communication costs are small, the number of plants located in region A increases and that of plants located in region B decreases with decreasing transportation costs.

The welfare analysis
In this section, we examine the impact of decreasing communication costs on the welfare of workers in the core and the periphery. Since the nominal wages of the unskilled and the skilled are independent of communication costs, the impact of falling communication costs on the welfare is determined by the change in the price index of manufactured goods in each region. First, we examine the price index in region A. Using (25), we have (44) and (55), we have: (48) and (53), we have:
In either pattern, two opposing effects work. First, the marginal cost of differentiated goods produced in region B decreases, which tends to increase P A . Second, the number of plants increases in region B and decreases in region A, which tends to increase P A . However, the second effects dominates the first, and hence the welfare in region Next, concerning the price index in region B, using (26), we have (44) and (55), we have: 
Conclusion
In this paper, globalization is characterized by lower communication costs between headquarters and plants and lower transportation costs of products. Each firm has the headquarter and chooses either to have a single plant in a region, or to have one plant in each region. Under the assumption that all headquarters are agglomerated in the core and that the productivity of unskilled workers in the traditional sector is higher in the core than in the periphery, we have examined the impact of globalization on the location pattern of plants between the core and the periphery.
From our analysis, we understand that multi-plants increase with decreasing communication costs when transportation costs of products are large due to the government regulation and the cultural differences and when the productivity difference of the skilled are small. This explains the fragmentation of the production by the automobile industry. On the other hand, single plants in the periphery increase with decreasing communication costs when transportation costs are small. This is suited to the globalization of the production by consumer electronics or the outsourcing of call centre. On the welfare, with decreasing communication costs, we could see that the workers in the core worse off and these in the periphery better off when the varieties are produced in both regions under medium communication costs. When communication costs are small enough, all plants are located in the periphery. In this case, all workers in both regions benefit from further lowering communication costs.
For further research, it is desirable to consider on the location of plants producing intermediate goods as well as plants producing final goods. Recently, the share of intermediate goods in trade has been increasing. By introducing the plants which produce intermediate goods, the forward and backward linkages would arise between the two types of plants, and we could explain the overseas expansion of a company producing intermediate goods as a factor of a fragmentation.
Appendix
A. The profit of firms whose HQs are in region B Using (7), (16), (17), (18), (19), (21) and (27), we obtain the profit of firms whose HQs are in region B as follows: 
Using ( 
Using (62), (63) 
On the other hand, substituting θ 
Using the first derivative of the left-hand side of (79) and (80) We can rewrite (70) as (79), whereas, (76) as (80). From the first derivative of the left-hand side of (79) and (80) 
